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Aerodromes located in mountainous areas are seldom served by approaches with three-dimensional guidance
based on instrument landing systems due to the lack of flexibility to define glide paths free of obstacles. But, three-
dimensional approaches are always preferred due to their effectiveness against controlled flight into terrain.
Free access to three-dimensional angular approaches is possible today without special authorization and ground
infrastructure. Some airports in mountainous areas of the United States, Canada, and Europe already benefit from
them due to the latest advances in satellite-based augmentation techniques. The majority of these procedures have
not been developed as category-one precision approaches, even though the latest operational service level foresees it.
Reported here are the signal assessment and procedure design carried out to enable the first category-one precision
approach supported by satellite-based augmentation system at an Austrian airport surrounded by one of the most
challenging terrainsworldwide. Thedesign and implementation of sucha procedure inmountainous terrain is feasible
after a thorough signal quality assessment. It can be placed where a classical instrument landing-system-based
approach procedure does not work and provides precision guidance for aircraft in instrument meteorological
conditions. This in turn enables a higher runway throughput and reduces cost for the users. When the controlling
obstacle is located outside of the precision segment, special attention should be put on the availability requirements.
I. Introduction
A ERODROMES in demanding mountainous environments areusually served by two-dimensional (2-D) approach procedures
without vertical guidance to achieve lower minima by establishing
stepdown descent profiles. However, the absence of vertical guidance
increases significantly the likelihood of controlled flight into terrain
(CFIT) due to loss of situational awareness and high cockpit work-
load during approach and landing in instrument meteorological con-
ditions when any outside references can only be visually acquired
shortly before landing. CFIT is a type of aircraft accident in which an
airworthy aircraft with full pilot control is unintentionally flown into
the ground, into a mountain, or into an obstacle. Usually, the flight
crew is oblivious of the imminent danger. The International Civil
Aviation Organization’s (ICAO’s) Assembly Resolution A37-11
urges member states to implement instrument approach procedures
(IAPs) with vertical guidance, wherever possible, as an effective
mitigation against CFIT. An IAP is a repeatable and charted method
to conduct an approach for landing at an airport. It safely guides the
aircraft from arrival altitude to a point from which the landing can be
performed.
The recent developments in the field ofGlobal Navigation Satellite
Systems (GNSSs) and its augmentations have opened up a new
spectrum of possibilities in aviation. Concretely, the satellite-based
augmentation system (SBAS) [1] now enables three-dimensional
(3-D) instrument landing system (ILS)-like approaches, also known
as localizer performance with vertical guidance (LPV). Both provide
angular deviations from the centerline and glide path to the pilot, but
the ILS does so by means of ground-based radio transmitters,
whereas LPVis computed fromGNSSposition data. LPVapproaches
have proven to be a cost-efficient solution to overcome airspace
limitations and reduce noise impact [2]. Legacy design criteria and
available levels of service, known as the approach procedure with
vertical guidance (APV), have supported LPV operations down to
250 ft above runway threshold formany years.With the improvement
of the signal performance, new operational service levels and design
criteria have been defined to support LPVoperations down to 200 ft,
qualifying these types of procedures as precision approaches for the
first time. This is called LPV200 or LPV category-one (CAT-I). As of
January of 2019 there are around 4000 LPVoperational approaches
in the United States of America (USA), 400 in Canada, and around
500 in Europe. India and Japan are expected to publish their first
LPV approaches in the near future. However, the implementation
of precision approaches in complex mountainous environments is
still marginal. High aerodrome operatingminima in terms of decision
height (DH) and the blockage of satellite signals by terrain (also
known as terrain masking) are the most common limiting factors
[3,4]. DH is the minimum height above ground at which the pilot
must have established visual reference to the landing runway. If this is
not the case, he or she must follow a predetermined missed approach
procedure. The LPV approaches to the Astronaut Kent Rominger
Airport (ICAO code KRCV) from the east and to Mc Elroy Airfield
(ICAO code K20V) from the north in the state of Colorado constitute
good examples of approaches in challenging terrain with landing
minima well above 250 ft [5]. In the USA, LPVs are designed as
category-one precision approaches only if the corresponding landing
minima can be below 250 ft as, for example, the approach to Jackson
Hole (ICAO code KJAC) from the north in the state of Wyoming [5].
This is not always the case in Europe, where a mixture of legacy
APVs and new CAT-I LPVs can be found serving runways where
prevailing terrain precludes CAT-I landing minima below 250 ft. For
example, the LPVapproaches to Sogndal (ICAO code ENSG) (Nor-
way) from the east [6] and to Annecy (ICAO code LFLP) (France)
from the south [7] were designed as CAT-I precision approaches,
even though the resulting DH lies well above 250 ft, thus discarding
any possibility of CAT-I operations based on the SBAS. On the other
hand, LPVapproaches in similar environments, such as those to the
regional airport of Bern-Belp (ICAO code LSZB) (Switzerland) [8],
were designed as APVs and not as precision approaches.
Received 18November 2018; revision received17April 2020; accepted for
publication 17 May 2020; published online Open Access 11 June 2020.
Copyright © 2020 by the authors. Published by the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., with permission. All requests for copying
and permission to reprint should be submitted to CCC at www.copyright.com;
employ the eISSN 2380-9450 to initiate your request. See also AIAA Rights
and Permissions www.aiaa.org/randp.
*Air Traffic Management Department, IFP Office, Wagramer Straße 19.
†Ph.D., Institute of Flight Guidance, Department of Pilot Assistance,
Lilienthalplatz 7, Braunschweig; Thomas.Dautermann@dlr.de.
Article in Advance / 1
JOURNAL OF AIR TRANSPORTATION
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 D
LR
 D
EU
TS
CH
ES
 Z
EN
TR
U
M
 F
U
ER
 L
U
FT
 U
N
D
 R
A
U
M
FA
H
RT
 o
n 
Ju
ne
 1
2,
 2
02
0 
| ht
tp:
//a
rc.
aia
a.o
rg 
| D
OI
: 1
0.2
514
/1.
D0
155
 
The fact that LPV approaches are independent of ground infra-
structure is of particular relevance for small general and business
aviation aerodromeswhere the costs of instrument landing aids do not
fulfill the business case or where the topography impedes the optimal
placement of such. The Austrian airport of Innsbruck, under ICAO
code LOWI, represents a good example of this limitation. This airport
lies in a valley flanked by high and steep mountains (see Fig. 1),
which can pose a great challenge to pilots and air traffic controllers in
combination with adverseweather. Accessibility to Innsbruck airport
is key to the economic development of the region, especially during
thewinter season. For that reason, Innsbruck is a breeding ground for
some of the most innovative flight procedures worldwide.
The most advanced 3-D approaches currently implemented in
Innsbruck are based on the navigation specification of required
navigation performance (RNP)/authorization required (AR), referred
to as RNP-AR, and are flown by most airliners with special authori-
zation. A navigation specification can be seen as a set of aircraft and
crew requirements that need to be met for a specific phase of flight.
The navigation specification also defines the navigational tolerances
that are to be used to create the containment areas and assess obstruc-
tions according to the specific design criteria. A detailed list of the
available navigation specification to date can be found in Ref. [9].
RNP-AR capabilities are traditionally out of scope for the general
aviation community due to the increased costs associated with more
demanding training and airworthiness certification requirements. No
3-D approach procedure based on standard RNP navigation specifi-
cation (without special authorization required), conventional ILS, or a
combination of both could be implemented until now in Innsbruck
due to topographic constraints. As a consequence, most general
aviation inbound flights to runway 26 (standard approach configura-
tion) still rely on a 2-D offset localizer/distancemeasuring equipment
(LOC/DME) approach. In a LOC/DME approach procedure, the
lateral guidance is provided by a very high-frequency-based localizer
directional aid [10] and distance information is provided by ultrahigh
frequency distance measuring equipment (DME). In this nonpreci-
sion approach, the vertical path is managed by the pilot through
altitude restrictions at stepdown fixes. Despite the existence of a steep
advisory glide slope at a nonstandard vertical path angle (VPA) in
Innsbruck, the publication of standard 3-D approaches can contribute
to lowering the risk of CFIT by enabling better aircraft energy
management during the approachwith less pilotworkload. The safety
benefits are even more evident if the approach guidance system
provides the user with angular sensitivity and geometrical vertical
guidance. This type of vertical guidance is not subject to barometric
altimetry errors such as temperature variations and Bernoulli effects,
which are very common in mountainous areas. Moreover, GNSS-
guided approaches eliminate critical areas in the final approach due to
reflection of the glide slope and/or localizer beams.
In this paper,we describe the implementation process carried out to
make possible the first 3-D approach with angular sensibility at the
alpine airport of Innsbruck, based on SBAS and with no special
authorization requirement.
II. Signal Analysis
We considered European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Ser-
vice (EGNOS) as themost appropriate technological means to date in
order to provide approach navigation service to the general and
business aviation community in Innsbruck. EGNOS is a SBAS,
i.e., an enhanced differential Global Positioning System (GPS) that
provides signal corrections plus signal quality parameters to users.
The user can then augment its measurements to compute a more
precise position. SBAS provides means for high-quality approaches
that do not depend on ground-based navigational aids and do not
require any special approval. Since 2015, EGNOSoffers the LPV200
service level on a free-of-charge basis in an extensive area across
Europe [11]. This service level supports 3-D approach operations of
typeBdown to 200 ft above runway threshold elevation [12],whereas
the legacy LPV service level does down to 250 ft. The LPV200
service also enables the application of ICAO CAT-I design criteria
with less restrictive obstacle assessment surfaces (OASs) [13]. Fur-
ther details on Global Navigation Satellite System signal-in-space
requirements for SBAS CAT-I design criteria can be found in
Ref. [14]. Before undertaking the design phase of the flight pro-
cedure, it is of paramount importance to ensure the availability of the
required signal in the area of interest. Given the complex topography
of the alpine area of Innsbruck and its possible effects on the aug-
mented navigational signal, we decided to use a combined approach
based on both simulations and on-site measurements.
A. Terrain Masking
To predict EGNOS performance in Innsbruck, we used a digital
terrain model of themountainous topography surrounding the airport
with a spatial resolution of 50m.We chose seven characteristic points
on the existing runway (RWY) 26 localizer (LOC) approach at
which we calculated satellite elevation masks due to the terrain with
a resolution of 5 deg in azimuth (see Fig. 1). Obstructions due to
terrain becomemore prominent the lower on the approach the aircraft
is located. Figure 2 shows that, at the lowest point on the existing
LOC/DME approach (at 3.5 nmiles of DME distance), both EGNOS
satellites are still visible to the user. The position of the EGNOS
broadcast satellite PseudoRandomNoise (PRN)120 ismarked in red,
whereas the PRN136 is marked in black. The terrain elevation mask
can reach up to 16 deg at a direction of 345 deg from the airport.
However, in the north, there are few satellites visible due to theGlobal
Positioning System orbital geometry.
B. Protection Level Prediction
To assess EGNOS performance for the LPV200 service level in
Innsbruck, we need to calculate a prediction of integrity data in the
form of protection levels as calculated by a receiver in real time.
Protection levels correspond to the ad hoc estimate of the position
uncertainty with a probability of one minus the integrity risk. In other
words, if the integrity risk is 2 × 10−7, then the user is 99.99998%
certain that the estimated position is within the cylinder defined by
radius horizontal protection level (HPL) andheight vertical protection
Fig. 1 Terrain elevation around Innsbruck airport (ICAO identifier LOWI) and characteristic points. Light tones represent the highest elevations.
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level (VPL). Details on the SBAS message and the calculation of
augmented user position and integrity data can be found, for example,
in Ref. [15]. Themainmodel parameters needed for the calculation of
the protection levels are the satellite geometry, the user differential
range error index (UDREI), and the grid ionosphere vertical error
index (GIVEI). UDREIs are 4 bit integer data that are broadcast by
the SBAS satellites and used to indicate the accuracy of combined
fast and long-term error corrections. The SBAS system assigns an
integer from 0 through 15 to each GNSS constellation satellite that is
monitored. By means of a lookup table in Ref. [15], a variance is
assigned and used in the computation of position and protection
levels. Similarly, the SBAS broadcasts information about the current
state of the ionosphere. These data consist of the vertical ionosphere
signal delay and the GIVEI. Again, the GIVEI are 4 bit integer
values from 0 to 15 describing the variance of the ionosphere delay
estimate at each grid point. To compute a meaningful prediction of
the protection levels, and thusEGNOSperformance,we need tomake
qualified assumptions on those quantities. They are also the main
input parameters of Stanford University’s MATLAB Algorithm
Availability Simulation Tool (MAAST) [16]. MAAST provides
proven program code for simulation of the GPS constellation based
on ephemeris data and user location as well as performance tools to
analyze navigation integrity, availability, continuity, and accuracy.
We calculated predicted approach protection levels using a current
almanac (basic set of parameters describing a satellite orbit [17]) from
GPS week 841 (1024) and the Stanford MAAST Toolkit. Since
the standard MAAST does not foresee to use different UDREIs and
GIVEIs per satellite, we modified the open software to include this
functionality. Details onMAAST can be found inRef. [16]. To obtain
a realistic value for the GIVEI and UDREI, we ran a statistical
analysis over all GIVEI data for the EGNOS in band 4 and band 5
located over central Europe. Bands 4 and 5 are sufficient because they
covermost of the central European landmass. An overview of the grid
point locations and bands can be found in RTCA Standard DO-229D
[15]. The EGNOS message data were obtained from the EGNOS
message ftp server.§ We used functions of RTKlib to decode the raw
messages and extract the relevant GIVEI data. Details on the RTKlib
functionality can be found inRef. [18].We also performed a statistical
analysis on the UDREI per PRN. From the statistical data, we
calculated the mean of the UDREI for 2015 and rounded up to
the nearest integer value. Using MAAST and the average GIVEI
and UDREI from 2015, as well as the satellite elevation masks
based on terrain, we computed 24 h predictions of the protection
levels at each one of the previously identified points. The results are
shown in Fig. 3. This figure shows the VPL at different DME
distances nmiles on the current LOC/DME approach and the number
of satellites used.As the altitude on the approach increases, the terrain
obstruction diminishes and more satellites become visible. This, in
turn, decreases the protection level. As expected, the lowest selected
point at 3.5 n miles gives the least satellite visibility and the largest
protection level.
We can see that the VPL at the 4.5-n-mile DMEposition at times of
5.5 and 12 h has a higher value than the one at the 3.5-n-mileDME.At
first sight, this appears contradictory since the point is located higher
on the approach path. However, the Wipp Valley shifts its position
relative to the user, causing a different satellite masking. The Wipp
Valley is located to the south of Innsbruck and leads to the Brenner
Pass, which is the main transit route from the Austrian Alps to Italy.
Relative to the approach to Innsbruck airport, it provides an area of
unobstructed view of the sky in the south. Therefore, from this
location, signals from GPS satellites can be received. From Fig. 1,
we can see that, relative to the points at which the EGNOS perfor-
mance is being evaluated, this patch of clear view to the sky changes
position, and thusmasks different portions of the sky at low elevation.
If a satellite is being removed from the navigation solution, the
protection level increases.
SBAS CAT-I approaches supported by EGNOS LPV200 service
require a vertical alert limit (VAL) of 35m and a horizontal alert limit
(HAL) of 40m [11]. Given these requirements and the outcome of the
MAAST simulation, we predict 100% availability in Innsbruck in the
normal case; i.e., no GPS satellite is out of service.
Furthermore, we simulated satellite failure of various satellites
during the day. The satellites were chosen as the ones giving the
highest increase in dilution of precision when removed successively.
The results, displayed in Fig. 4, show conformance with the required
availability (99% as per Ref. [14]) based on the parameters of
the prediction. Even if two or more critical satellites failed, leading
to very short violations of the required VAL at very specific moments
during the day, the impact on the service operation would be far from
relevant. This is due to the probability of an unscheduled single
satellite failure interruption. According to Ref. [19], it is less than
0.0002, making a dual satellite failure highly unlikely at 4 × 10−8.
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Fig. 3 Vertical protection levels at different DME distances (nautical
miles) on the current LOC/DME approach (top) and number of satellites
used (bottom). The alert limit in the top graph is 35mandnot shown since
it would obscure data variations.
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Fig. 2 Terrain elevationmask (vertical axis in degrees) at 3.5 DME and
1410 ft Above Ground Level (AGL) on LOC approach to Innsbruck
RWY 26. Azimuth axis in degrees (0 represents true north). Inside the
blue line, satellites are visible to the GNSS receiver. Outside the blue line,
terrain obscures and blocks signal reception.
§Data available online at ftp://ems.estec.esa.int/pub/ [retrieved 27 October
2016].
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C. Availability Measurements
To confirm the results of the simulations with MAAST, we per-
formed a 24 h error measurement campaign at Innsbruck airport from
1March2017 at 1200 hrs until 2March 2017 at 1300 hrs local time, as
in the submitted manuscript. One extra hour was added due to more
time available for recording data. We used the permanent GNSS
L1/L2 antenna mounted on the localizer shelter that usually provides
reference data for the calibration of the localizer signal. To have
comparable results, we added this position as point D0.0 to the
MAAST Simulation and reran the prediction for this additional point
again. During a measurement campaign, main parameters can be
different from the ones used in the simulation. The most important
one is the satellite almanac used for the simulation and the orbital
parameters of the actual constellation during the measurements.
Figure 5 shows the differences between varying the input parameters
of the UDREI, GIVEI, and age of the almanac of the MAAST,
bringing the prediction closer to reality. The largest impact on the
calculation of the protection levels is provided by the almanac used to
simulate satellite orbits. Using the averaged UDREI or averaged
GIVEI only influences the computation of the protection levels at
an average of 7.7% as the protection levels map the residual pseudor-
ange error into the position domain. The mapping function is com-
puted from the satellite orbits, whereas the residual pseudorange error
is provided by the UDREI and GIVEI. Since, on a regular day (no
solar flares, no satellite clock runaways, etc.), the transmitted error
indices are relatively close to their mean value, the use of the actual
value does not influence the protection level much. Using an older
almanac with a significant change in orbital parameters has a great
influence on the mapping function and can lead to a change in
protection levels to the point that the correlation between the simu-
lation results is close to zero. Figure 6 shows the protection level
as measured on 1 March 2017 at the localizer shelter of Innsbruck
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Airport compared with a prediction that uses the almanac of March 1
and the UDREI as measured in Innsbruck. We can see that the
prediction does come on average within 14.7% of reality. It is not
exactly the same since the prediction uses an average GIVEI per
grid point.
We still see 100% availability of EGNOSLPV200 if the prediction
is based on the almanac of March 1 and the measured UDREI
(see Fig. 7).
Finally, we ruled out integrity and availability problems by gen-
erating Stanford plotswith themeasured position error and protection
level data. These plots are shown in Figs. 8a and 8b, and they confirm
that the system operates within the usable and safe range (i.e., actual
navigational error bounded by protection levels and protection levels
bounded by alert limits).
To evaluate integrity and continuity of an SBAS system,
actual navigation performance and protection levels are
plotted as a 3-D histogram in an integrity plot. The integrity
plot can be divided into four areas: For normal operations,
the position error is smaller than the protection level which is
in turn smaller than the alert limit (white area). The system
is available and overbounding the actual position error
correctly. If the protection level is larger than the alert limit
the system is unavailable for use (yellow area). Should
the position error exceed the protection level, misleading
information is given by the system (red/pink area). In case
the position error is larger than the alert limit, thismisleading
information becomes hazardous to the aircraft (red area)
since no guarantee for it to be within the protected area can
be given [1].
Further information on Stanford plots can be found in Ref. [20].
Overall, all predictions and measurements are in line with the per-
formance required to provide LPV200 service in Innsbruck.
III. Procedure Design
The specific design rules applicable to GNSS approaches are
promulgated in the second volume of the Procedures for Air Navi-
gation Services–Aircraft Operations (PANS-OPS) [13], including
specific criteria for the intermediate, final, and missed approach
segments in an SBAS context. These design criteria include the use
of more flexible OASs based on a CAT-I precision approach when-
ever it can be supported by the appropriate service level. The EGNOS
LPV200 service level proved sufficient performance in Innsbruck, as
described in the previous section. As a result, we applied SBASCAT-
I procedure design criteria for this first implementation.
It is important to note that, even if CAT-I OASs are used for the
design, the obstacle situation determines the obstacle clearance
height (OCH), and therefore the type of operations possible after
all. Nevertheless, the application of CAT-I design criteria can still be
justified due to less stringent protection areas, even if the resulting
operations lead to DH≥250 ft, and hence cannot be classified as 3-D
approaches of type B CAT-I according to Annex 6 to the Chicago
Convention of the ICAO [12].
The initial operational requirements that we defined in cooperation
with the relevant stakeholders such as airport operator, air traffic
controllers, and airlines can be summarized as follows: the resulting
IAP had to be compatible with a procedural separation with visual
flight rules traffic within the control zone (CTR), match the current
visual precision approach path indicator settingswithVPA3.5 deg,
have a final approach segment with a length of around 6–8 n miles
and, if possible, include a missed approach that imitates the current
RNP-AR approach following the valley west of the runway. Above
all, fulfilling these two last requirements posed the biggest challenge
to the procedure design team and required certain tradeoff to produce
an IAP with reasonable OCHs after many design iterations. Because
of massive terrain penetrations in the protection areas, we replaced
the straight missed approach pathwith a turn designated at a waypoint
before the runway threshold. Likewise, we calculated an offset
(4.7 deg) final approach segment of 9.2 n miles to keep the intermedi-
ate approach segment in an area where the aircraft still has enough
altitude so as to keep the required minimum obstacle clearance
(MOC). Any other attempts to shorten the final approach segment
by excluding high terrain features on the sides of the InnValley proved
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Fig. 6 Measured vs predicted vertical protection levels: GIVEI fixed values, almanac from 1 March 2017, and broadcast UDREI.
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unfruitful due to the wide protection areas required by the navigation
specification required navigation performance approach (RNP
APCH). The final design, including calculated protection areas, can
be seen in Figs. 9a and 9b.
We used the dedicated procedure design software Flight
Procedure Design and Management from IDS AirNav¶ in combina-
tion with spreadsheets to create protection areas, assess obstructions,
and validate the results. To that end, we imported an updated obstacle
database and a digital terrain model [21] with a postspacing of
approximately 50 m. into the software.
The procedure begins at the initial approach fix (IAF) (WI610)
at 9500 ft abovemean sea level (AMSL) to facilitate the access via air
traffic control (ATC) vectors. The minimum radar vectoring altitude
(MRVA) in the area is 9500 ft AMSL. The intermediate fix (IF)
(WI612) has a procedural altitude of 6300 ft AMSL.Between the IAF
and the IF, the waypoint WI611 serves as a stepdown fix to ensure
a safe “dive-and-drive” descent without loss of obstacle clearance in
case no continuous descent approach is executed. The procedural
altitude at WI611 is 7200 ft AMSL. We draw on procedural altitudes
in this design to keep descent gradients within standard ICAO values
[13]. Procedural altitudes are always equal or greater than minimum
obstacle clearance altitudes.
To minimize terrain obstructions due to the prominent topographi-
cal features of the valley, the intermediate approach segment contains
a 28 deg track change to intercept the final approach course before the
nominal final approach point (FAP). The overall length of the inter-
mediate segment cannot be longer than 2 nmiles for the same reason.
As per the ICAO PANS-OPS design criteria [13], the straight com-
ponent of the segment shall be equal or greater than 2 n miles. The
straight component is, in this case, obviously less than 2 n miles due
to the required track change at the IF (WI612); its actual length will
be variable, depending on individual flight parameters such as radius
of turn and bank establishment delay. Nevertheless, a conservative
estimate can be derived by applying PANS-OPS minimum stabiliza-
tion distances [13]. This yields a straight component of 0.8 n miles
for the intermediate segment in the worst case (high speed, heavy
aircraft). The current design criteria do not consider track changes of
less than 50 deg, which is the reason why the results are even more
conservative and far from reality in this case. This deviation from the
design criteria was considered acceptable after the corresponding
safety assessment and flight validation.
The semiwidth of the protection areas in the initial and intermediate
approach segments is 2.5 n miles, including secondary areas. Secon-
dary areas linearly decrease the full applicable MOC at their inner
boundaries to zero at their outer boundaries. The applicableMOC for
the initial and intermediate segments are 984 and 492 ft, respectively.
To account for the switch of the receiver to the SBAS approachmode
2 n miles before the nominal FAP (WI613), the semiwidth of the
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Fig. 8 Stanford diagram of the a) horizontal component and b) vertical component.
¶Available online at https://www.idsairnav.com/main-areas/aim/flight-
procedure-design/fpdam/ [retrieved 4 June 2020].
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protection areas reduces linearly to join the extension of the CAT-I
OASs at the nominal FAP, and the OASs extend into the intermediate
segment (see Fig. 9a).
Due to the final approach offset, the geometry of the final approach
path is based on a fictitious runway aligned with the final approach
track and with a fictitious threshold point (FTP) at the same elevation
as the real threshold of RWY26. The GNSS azimuth reference point
(GARP) point, equivalent to the conventional localizer antenna, is
then set 305 m after the fictitious runway end to ensure a nominal
course width of 105 m at the FTP (see Fig. 10). This is necessary
to provide an appropriate sensitivity of the lateral deviations during
final approach. A point lying on the same ellipsoidal plane (GPS
height) as the FTP and located at the fictitious runway end acts as a
flight-path alignment point (FPAP) and defines the alignment of the
final approach segment along with the FTP. A lateral view of a
generic final approach segment (FAS) is depicted in Fig. 11. Note
that the glide path intercept point (GPIP), which defines the origin of
the vertical guidance, is not directly input by the procedure designer
into the final approach segment data block, but its coordinates are
computed by the SBAS equipment on board by using othermain final
approach segment parameters. The final approach segment data
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Fig. 9 Procedure tracks and protection areas of initial, intermediate, and final approaches including a) SBAS segment and b) the final missed approach.
Note that altitudes and elevations are in feet.
Fig. 10 Top view of the final approach segment geometry correspond-
ing to the LPV approach to RWY26 in Innsbruck.
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block is a set of parameters, which contain all necessary information
for the aircraft to calculate deviations relative to the desired final
approach segment. It is described inRef. [13]with the key parameters
being the landing threshold point, the glide path (GP) angle, the
threshold crossing height (TCH), and the full-scale course deviation
indicator, given by the GARP and the coursewidth or absolute lateral
deviation when crossing the landing threshold. We used the EURO-
CONTROL SBAS FAS Data Block online tool [22] to encode the
final approach segment data block out of the many design inputs (see
Table 1).
The height loss concept, widely used in 3-D approaches such a
s ILS and baro-VNAV [13], is applied as well to calculate the OCH
within the precision segment spanning from the nominal FAP to
the missed approach turning fix (MATF) (WI614). The OASs are
identical to those of an ILS CAT-I, with the only difference that the
side surfacesY are always contained in a corridorwith a semiwidth of
0.95 n miles to protect for an early missed approach, triggering a
premature switch from angular to linear guidance (see Fig. 9a).
The position of the MATF (WI614) that initiates the final phase of
the missed approach with a 180 deg turn is key to reach a reasonable
OCH.High terrain obstructions on the side of thevalley fall inevitably
within the turn area. Only a thorough iterative selection of the way-
point coordinates on the order ofmeters led to the best OCHs possible
for different missed approach (MA) climb gradients. The final loca-
tion of theMATF enables the turn at a pointwhere thewidth of the Inn
Valley makes it feasible. In this turn area, the Inn Valley intersects
with the Wipp Valley in the south (see Fig. 9b).
Two important design considerations of the current criteria for this
type of procedure have to be taken into account when selecting the
final position of the MATF. The first one is related to the existing
offset with respect to the extension of the runway centerline. Accord-
ing to PANS-OPS, the intercept point between the offset segment and
the extension of theRWYcenterline (see Fig. 10) has to reach a height
of at least 180 ft above threshold. In our procedure, this intercept
height is 790 ft above threshold. The lowest OCH allowed without
considering obstacles is then calculated by adding 66 ft, which yields
856 ft. On the other hand, the position of theMATF and its associated
along-track tolerance (ATT) of 0.24 n miles are of paramount impor-
tance because they define the beginning of the turn area that protects
for the latest turn possible. To reduce the portion of high terrain
obstructions captured by the turn area, a limitation on the radius
of turn in still air is necessary. The radius of turn can be expressed
as R  V2∕g tan α, assuming a uniform stationary turn, where V
represents true airspeed (TAS), g is the acceleration due to gravity,
and α is the bank angle. The radius of turn is then used in combination
with the effect of an omnidirectional wind factor of 30 kt to determine
the drift of the outermost trajectory throughout the turn, which is also
known as wind spiral (see Fig. 12). We established a maximum turn
radius of 0.9 n miles by limiting the indicated air speed (IAS) to a
maximum of 153 kt and demanding a bank angle of at least 25 deg
during the missed approach turn. An IAS of 153 kt corresponds to
a TAS of approximately 169 kt at the highest point possible of all
nominal turns calculated for the various climb gradients and assum-
ing a positive variation to the International Standard Atmosphere of
15°C. The restriction on the bank angle during the missed approach
turn is a clear deviation to PANS-OPS design criteria [13], which
foresee a bank angle of 15 deg for this phase of flight. This bank angle
limitation is currently promulgated during the missed approach turn
of the LOC/DME approach to the same runway and was likewise
considered acceptable after the corresponding safety assessment and
flight validation. According to the design criteria, the earliest missed
approach turn (MATF–ATT) has to be coincident with the latest
start of climb (SOC) to avoid turns with negative vertical speed
(see Fig. 12). The SOC is the point at which the aircraft begins to
climb after initiating a go-around. This results in the lowest SOC
being possible at the point where 548 ft above RWY threshold are
reached along the final approach path. For Aircraft Approach Cat-
egoryC (CAT-C) operations, and considering the penalty added to the
corresponding height loss for VPA >3.2 deg, the lowest possible
OCH for the procedure would be 712 ft. These two limitations are
below the OCH imposed by the controlling obstacle for the different
missed approach climb gradients published (see the minima box on
the bottom left-hand side of the chart in Fig. 13) but may be the
limiting factor if smaller protection areas can be applied for the
missed approach at some point in the future.
After the firstmissed approach turn atWI614, the procedureguides
the aircraft back along the valley up to the holding fix of Rattenberg
(RTT), where 11,500 ft AMSL are required to provide enough
separation with inbound traffics while flying the holding pattern.
IV. Safety Assessment and Flight Inspection
EGNOS is an extremely accurate navigation system. It is com-
posed of satellites and ground stations that improve the accuracy of
the Global Navigation Satellite System. The “ILS-lookalike” proce-
dures can be seen as the most significant backup procedure for ILS in
Fig. 11 Lateral view of a generic FAS (based on Ref. [13]).
Table 1 FAS Data Block for the LPV approach to RWY26 at
Innsbruck International Airport (Austria)
Name Value
Operation TYPE 0
SBAS Provider 1
Airport identifier LOWI
Runway 26
Runway direction 0
Approach performance designator 0
Route indicator E
Reference path data selector 0
Reference path identifier E26A
Landing threshold point (LTP) latitude 471532.2960°N
LTP longitude 0112128.0660°E
LTP ellipsoidal height, m 626.0
FPAP Latitude 471517.7745°N
Delta FPAP latitude, s −14.5215
FPAP longitude 0112000.3950°E
Delta FPAP longitude, s −87.6710
TCH, ft 50.0
TCH units selector 0
Glide-path angle, deg 3.49
Course width, m 105.00
Length offset, m 0
HAL, m 40.0
VAL, m 35.0
Calculated cyclic redundancy check 53B35640
ICAO code LO
LTP/FTP orthometric height, m 577.0
FPAP orthometric height, m 577.0 Fig. 12 Construction of the missed approach turn before the runway
threshold (based on Ref. [13]).
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Austria, especially for a large group of general aviation aircraft that
cannot fly barometric VNAV approaches, and therefore only gains
vertical guidance in GNSS approaches by means of SBAS. SBAS
service does not require the installation or maintenance of ground-
based landing system navigation aids. The SBAS augmented position
and guidance do not change with barometric and temperature fluctu-
ations, and they are not impactedwith an improper aircraft barometric
altimeter setting. Besides the general approval of SBAS as a landing
aid in Annex 10 [14], the ICAO requires that each published instru-
ment approach undergoes a procedure specific safety assessment.
EUROCONTROL has already developed a generic concept of oper-
ations [23] for APV SBAS approach procedures in which a series of
minimum requirements are identified. In addition, Ref. [24] released
generic safety case guidance material for LPVapproaches to a 200 ft
decision height. To complete the safety assessment and, comple-
menting Ref. [24] for Innsbruck, we assessed the hazards for the
LPV procedure to be implemented in Table 2. Here, we identify the
operational function, hazard cause, and existing and additional mit-
igation actions. The pre- andpostmitigation action severity classes are
indicated. The appendix to the Austrian Air Navigation Services
(ANS) Safety Regulatory Framework defines the acceptable risk
severity for air navigation services in order to enable a quantitative
risk-based approach fulfilling the requirements of the European
commission (EC) regulation no. 2096/2005. The target levels of
safety for Austro Control are as follows:
1) Contributing to an accident of a commercial airplane is severity
class 1
2) Contributing to a serious incident of a commercial airplane is
severity class 2
3) Contributing to a major incident of a commercial airplane is
severity class 3
4)Contributing to a significant incident of a commercial airplane is
severity class 4
5) No direct contribution to safety occurrences is severity class 5
Table 2 only shows the additional hazards that are nongeneric to
LPV procedures, or for which Austro Control has defined additional
mitigation actions. All others can be found in Ref. [24] and are not
repeated here.When theEGNOSsafety of life service is not available,
or when the GPS constellation does not support the LPV approach,
Austro Control will issue notices to airmen to advise pilots. They
must then fly another approach procedure. Flight crews that use LPV
equipment are expected to have completed training about this type of
approach and are sufficiently confident in handling it. Furthermore, it
is expected that the database that is loaded into the aircraft navigation
system is current and complete. Aircraft have to be certified for SBAS
operation in accordancewith the EuropeanAviation Safety Agency’s
(EASA’s)AcceptableMeans ofCompliance (AMC) 20-28 [25] or the
last issue of EASA Certification Specifications and Acceptable
Means of Compliance for Airborne Communications, Navigation
and Surveillance (CS-ACNS) [26]. The safety assessment was pos-
itively reviewed by three independent experts in the areas of air traffic
control, flight operations, and airworthiness, respectively.
For the procedure to be published in the national Aeronautical
Information Publication (AIP), it has to be properly flight inspected
and validated according to volume 2 of ICAO document 8071 [27],
as well in line with volume 5 of ICAO document 9906 [28]. Both
documents provide the complete methodology for performing flight
validation and flight inspection of instrument flight procedures.
To get an overview of the techniques involved, we provide the three
most important examples from the flight-test report in the following
paragraph.
For flight inspection, data house Jeppesen provided a trial navi-
gation database in raw Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated (ARINC)
424 format [29] to Flight Calibration Services (FCS)**: a German
N MILES
Fig. 13 Chart of the LPV approach to RWY 26 in Innsbruck (AIP Austria: effective date 21 June 2018; Austro Control, GmbH ©).
**Data available online at https://www.fcs.aero/.
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professional flight validation and inspection company. In the first step
of validation, FCS reviewed the received experimental navigation
database for potential codingmistakes that could have occurredwhen
transferring AIP data into the specific ARINC424 database format.
Here, it was found that the turn direction toward WI613 was missing
from the coding, and a typographic error pertaining to the waypoint’s
coordinates was discovered. This was consequently corrected by the
provider. Next, the database was loaded into the Aerodata AD-AFIS-
220 flight inspection system of the flight inspection aircraft with
registration D-CFMD: a Beech 300 Super King Air 350. The Aero-
data AFIS-220 calculates a precise reference position using a hybrid
solution of barometric altitude, inertial platforms, and a precision
differential GNSS. The GNSS data were recorded at 1 Hz. Flight
validation was successfully completed on 3 June 2017 from 1058 to
1119 hrs Universal Time Coordinated (UTC). Theweather was good,
with variable wind direction and wind strength of 2 kt. Visibility was
more than 10 km, scattered clouds were 7000 ft above the aerodrome,
and the temperature was 26°C. Sea level pressure was 1015 hPa.
Section 5.3 of Ref. [27] required the procedure navigation accuracy to
be verified according to procedure design requirements, as specified
in Ref. [13]. The requirements are a required crosstrack navigation
performance (95% confidence interval) of 1 n mile in the initial
and intermediate approach segments, and tapering to 0.3 n miles for
the final approach segment, where the angular guidance calculation
begins. For the final approach according to LPV, the total system error
may not exceed more than half of the full-scale deflection. The
navigation sensor error (NSE) should not exceed the horizontal alert
limit of 40 m and the vertical alert limit of 35 m. During the flight
Table 2 Safety assessment table specific for the Innsbruck Airport
Function Hazard and cause Current risk minimization
Worst case operational
consequence Severity
Safety
goal
Additional risk
minimization Postseverity
EGNOS signal
in
mountainous
terrain
Loss of satellites/signal Quality assessment of
GPS/EGNOS signal
through simulations and
measurements on site
Application of SBAS was
possible
Missed approach 4 —— N/A 4
Loss of GNSS/
EGNOS signal
during final
approach or
missed
approach
phase
Troubles with GNSS or
EGNOS signal; loss of
satellites/jamming/
problems with equipment
Pilot should initiate
contingency procedure
radar vectoring—
surveillance coverage
available at all Austrian
airports
Use non-GNSS
approach
4 No
greater
than
before
Safety recommendation:
briefing ATCOs radar
vectoring–in case the
aircraft is still at or above
the MRVA/SMA
5
Procedure
design
Two deviations from
ICAO DOC 8168 [13]:
minimum bank angle in
the missed approach
greater than 15 deg,
straight leg in
intermediate segment less
than 2 n miles
Procedure properly
validated according to
ICAO DOC 9906 [28]
Minimum bank angle:
aircraft gets outside
area for which
procedure is not
protected Intermediate
segment: final
approach course
wrongly intercepted
3 No
greater
than
before
Safety recommendation,
flight validation:
approach was positively
evaluated in VMC,
which endorsed
proposed design Safety
recommendation,
intensive testing in an
experimental simulator
to discard flyability
issues even under
extreme wind conditions
successful
4
Minima lines
on the
published
chart do not
distinguish
between LPV
or LPV200
operations
Where both minima
criteria coexist, operators
may mix the system
minima, leading to a
situation where a DH
below 250 ft is considered
for LPV based on APV-I
criteria
Since published minima
by Austro Control in form
of OCH are already equal
to or greater than 250 ft for
LPVapproaches based on
APV-I criteria at target
airports, there is no risk
for operators confusing
operating minima
Increased collision risk 4 No
greater
than
before
N/A 4
N/A = not available
ATCO = Air Traffic Control Officer
VMC = Visual Meteorological Conditions
APV-1 = Approach Performance with Vertical guidance one
SMA = Surveillance Minimum Altitude
Table 3 Coding table used for LPV approach to RWY26 at Innsbruck International Airport (Austria)a
Point Leg Latitude Longitude Distance, n miles Course Altitude, ft Remarks
WI610 (IAF) IF N472322.41 E0114654.41 —— —— +9,500 ——
WI611 TF N471944.76 E0114055.80 5.4 T228.3 +7,200 ——
WI612 (IF) TF N471821.49 E0113838.95 2.1 T228.2 +6,300 ——
WI613 (FAP) TF N471753.55 E0113547.48 2.0 T256.5 +5,750 ——
WI614 (MATF) TF N471544.57 E0112242.29 9.2 T256.5 —— Flyover
WI103 (MATF) DF N471616.49 E0112647.56 —— —— —— IAS ≤ 153 kt ; bank ≥ 25 deg
WI612 (MATF) TF N471821.49 E0113838.95 8.3 T075.4 —— ——
WI610 (MATF) TF N472322.41 E0114654.41 7.5 T048.2 —— ——
RTT (MAHF) TF N472551.32 E0115624.19 6.9 T068.9 +11,500 Flyover
aThe navigation specification used is RNPAPCH.
TF = Track to Fix, DF = Direct to Fix, and IF = Initial Fix.
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inspection, the AD-AFIS-220 measured a average crosstrack total
system error from the designed path of−0.079 nmileswith a standard
deviation of 0.262 n miles by comparing the precision differential
GNSS position with the one provided by the standard avionics. The
total system error is the addition of the ability of the aircraft to follow a
desired path combined with the error of the navigation sensor NSE.
These values are fully within the limit of 1 n mile for initial and
intermediate approaches. For the LPV final approach, the maximum
vertical deviation reached 2.1%of full scale, and themaximum lateral
deviation reached 0.3% of full scale. The final approach during flight
inspection lasted 140 s, and lateral deviation data were sampled at
10 Hz. ThemaximumNSE during that timewas 4.5 m horizontal and
0.76 m vertical as measured with the precision differential GNSS.
Section 2.3.1 of Ref. [27] requires the verification of adequate
GNSS signal reception. This is accomplished by measuring the
signal’s carrier to noise ratio at the receiver front end [14]. Section
3.7.3.1.7.4 defines the adequate reception power of GNSS satellites
to be above−158.5 dB ⋅W. GNSS receivers usually measure carrier
to noise ratio as a quality indicator of the received signal [30]. Typical
thermal noise N at the surface of the Earth at 15 deg is
N  kBT  3.98 × 10−21 W∕Hz  −204 dB∕Hz
Reference [14] stipulates a 3 dB gain in the antenna. Therefore, a
rough estimate for the minimum carrier to noise density ratio is
C∕N0  −158.5 dB ⋅W − −204 dB∕Hz − 3 dB  42.5 dB∕Hz
The receiver front end design is a trade secret of each receiver
manufacturer, and thus not publicly available. Note that advanced
receiver technologies permit a tracking of satellites using a much
lower carrier to noise ratio for the same received signal power. Hence,
we stipulate that our approach to transferring ICAO requirements to
carrier to noise ratio is very conservative. Carrier to noise data were
collected during one approach from a time stamp of 39,692 s of the
day to a time stamp 40,030 s. This yields a total measuring time of
338 s.At a 1Hz sampling and trackinga total of nineGPSsatellites,we
collected 3051 samples. The mean value was 47.7 dB∕Hz and the
standard deviationwas1.4 dB∕Hz. During thevalidation, the signal to
noise ratio over all nine GPS satellites was ranging from 44.1 dB∕Hz
at an elevation of 30.2 deg to 50.57 dB∕Hz at an elevation of 66.1 deg.
TheSBASsignalswere receivedwith46.047 dB∕Hz. Thus, the signal
reception is adequate, and it indicates that there is no signal degrada-
tion due to interference.Of course, the flight validation provides only a
snapshot of signal measurements. It is intended for the certifying
authority to see that all the technology is functional. For this purpose,
the data collection during one approach is adequate. More data would
result in statistically more meaningful results, but flight time is costly;
and, a statistically meaningful campaign to, for example, validate
integrity at a 10−5 would require at least 100,000 samples. At 1 Hz,
this amounts to 27.8 h of flight data, which are too expensive for
implementing a single approach. The flight validation report is pro-
vided as Supplemental Material.
V. Conclusions
The final procedure design is materialized through the correspond-
ing coding table and chart shown in Table 3 and Fig. 13, respectively.
The coding table contains a textual description of the sequence of
ARINC424 path terminators required by flightmanagement systems.
Further information on path terminators andARINC424 coding rules
can be found in Ref. [29]. SBAS approach procedures also require
the final approach segment data block, which encodes the geometry
of the final approach path (see Table 1) into 21 fields including
the cyclic redundancy check integrity field as per ICAO Annex 10
[14]. The combination of the coding table and final approach segment
data block is of utmost importance because it conveys the procedure
designer’s intent to the end user. A small error in these datasets
may result in a different approach path definition for which obstacle
clearance is not provided. The outcome of the flight inspection
confirmed the positive results of the signal availability measurements
and simulations. During the flight validation, the aircraft was forced
to fly close to the edges of the protection areas to detect potential
obstacle-related hazards. This can be done by flying the final and
missed approaches at a slight higher speed, a lower missed approach
climb gradient, and a minimum bank angle for a given DH. The
results endorsed the two design criteria deviations and confirmed a
good flyability. Despite the many challenges posed by the mountain-
ous terrain in Innsbruck, it was shown that an SBAS CAT-I precision
approach can be designed even where ILS approaches could not be
implemented in the past.
A proper signal assessment to ensure availability for the required
operational service level is key to a successful implementation in
environments with complex terrain. The methods described in the
Signal Analysis section (Sec. II) may be applied to other airports
where signal reception and GNSS performance are unclear at the
beginning of LPV implementation. Likewise, a thorough procedure
designwithmany iterationsmay be necessary to find the optimum set
of design parameters that makes the approach flyable. In this regard,
the flight validation plays a critical role, especially if the procedure
contains deviations to the standard design criteria.
Nevertheless, LPVapproaches still require relatively large protec-
tion areas for mountainous environments. Authorization required
procedures may be necessary to achieve a considerable reduction
of the landing minima, thereby increasing accessibility, but only to a
few operators. As shown here, the operational benefits of the more
stringent SBAS CAT-I approaches (with vertical alert limit of 35 m)
cannot be gained if the controlling obstacle is not located within the
precision segment. Thus, SBASAPVapproachesmay sometimes be a
better option over SBASCAT-I in areas with challenging terrain. This
can be critical in environments where average protection levels
fluctuate right underneath the alert limits, thus raising the likelihood
of persistent integrity events. However, this does not seem to be the
case of Innsbruck for the time being. Therefore, in order to maximize
availability, the implementation of legacy SBAS APVapproaches is
advocated in mountainous terrain if the corresponding SBAS CAT-I
approach cannot bring along a significant operational benefit.
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